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Abstract
Parametric regression models are often not flexible enough to capture the true relationships
as they tend to rely on arbitrary identification assumptions. Using the UK Labor Force
Survey, the authors estimate the causal effect of national minimum wage (NMW)
increases on the probability of job entry and job exit by means of a non-parametric
Bayesian modelling approach known as Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART).
The application of this methodology has the important advantage that it does not require
ad-hoc assumptions about model fitting, number of covariates and how they interact. They
find that the NMW exerts a positive and significant impact on both the probability of job
entry and job exit. Although the magnitude of the effect on job entry is higher, the overall
effect of NMW is ambiguous as there are many more employed workers. The causal effect
of NMW is higher for young workers and in periods of high unemployment and they
have a stronger impact on job entry decisions. No significant interactions were found with
gender and qualifications.
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1 Introduction 
The most characteristic feature of the literature on the causal impact of the minimum wage on 
employment is the general lack of consensus. Neumark and Washer (2007) compile an extensive 
survey of previous research and conclude that the minimum wage exerts an adverse impact on 
employment of low-skilled workers and a non-significant impact on total employment. However, 
other surveys on this issue, a meta-analysis by Card and Krueger (1995) and the subsequent 
contributions by Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) and De Linde et al. (2014) find that there is a 
wide range of results in the previous research, and that once the publication selection bias is 
accounted for the mean estimate is consistent with a non-significant impact of the minimum wage 
on employment. 
A possible reason for the wide range of findings is the fact that the results hinge dramatically 
on ad hoc assumptions about the parametric specification of the empirical model and on the 
definition of the control group in the analysis. This is corroborated in the insightful and interesting 
discussion in a series of papers by Allegretto et al. (2011, 2013), Dube et al. (2010), and Neumark 
et al. (2014) in a state-level panel analysis for the US. Dube et al. (2010) and Allegretto et al. 
(2011) suggest that it is essential to control for spatial heterogeneity in order to estimate the impact 
of the minimum wage in a panel data setting. In particular, they propose to include two types of 
local controls consisting of: (1) jurisdiction-specific linear time trends; and (2) interactions 
between time dummy variables for sets of neighboring states or neighboring counties so they 
could be used as controls to determine the impact of the minimum wages. Subsequently, Neumark 
et al. (2014) and Sabia et al. (2014) criticize these measures on the grounds that there are other 
non-linear ways of controlling for unobserved trends and that this approach excludes other 
potential controls apart from those for the neighboring regions. Crucially, the parametric form of 
the model appears to be the critical determinant of whether a significant or insignificant impact 
of minimum wage on employment is obtained. Hirsch et al. (2015), in turn, argue that the lack of 
a significant effect can be driven by alternative channels of adjustment such as changes in prices, 
profits, performance standards, and wage compression.  
Another potential problem of the minimum-wage literature mentioned above is the fact that 
many studies analyze this issue using aggregate data.1 Aggregation might mask the real effect of 
minimum wage at the individual level. Moreover, the analyses based on aggregate data could be 
affected by endogeneity as mimimum wage movements could be caused by regional or national 
macroeconomic variables (Baskaya and Rubinstein, 2012; Sabia, 2014). While policy variables 
can be endogenous to aggregate employment indicators, they are clearly exogenous with respect 
to specific individuals and their outcomes. 
In this paper, we use the UK Labor Force Survey to estimate the causal impact of the UK 
national minimum wage (NMW) on employment using a non-parametric Bayesian modelling 
approach known as the Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART henceforth) that was 
originally developed by Chipman et al. (2010) and applied to the analysis of causal inference by 
Hill (2011), Sparapani et al. (2016), Tan et al. (2016) and others. This procedure shares some 
similarities with standard matching estimation strategies (see for example Abadie and Imbens, 
2006), as it compares unemployment-to-employment and employment-to-unemployment 
_________________________ 
1 See for example Lee et al (1990) for a discussion on aggregation bias. 
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transitions of individuals affected by the NMW increase with similar individuals who are 
unaffected by the increase but are sufficiently similar to the treatment group. The BART 
procedure has important advantages over other more traditional parametric specifications. Among 
them, it does not require any type of hypotheses or priors over the covariates to be included in the 
model, it can consider a large number of regressors, and it can estimate any type of interactive 
effects between the treatment variable and any other variable. Thus, under the BART model, the 
definition of the closest untreated individual for each treated individual and the interactions 
between the different clusters of individuals and time or and any other relevant covariate is not 
constrained to follow any specific (and potentially ad-hoc) parametric function. Furthermore, and 
more importantly, the parametric function need not be specified a priori. 
Our paper is closely related to at least two previous works that estimate the impact of the UK 
NMW on employment at the individual level using micro-data: Stewart (2004) and Dickens and 
Draca (2005). Stewart (2004) analyzes how the introduction of the UK NMW in 1999 and its 
subsequent changes in 2000 and 2001 affected the employment-to-employment transition. 
Dickens and Draca (2005) follow a similar approach for the NMW increases in October 2003 but 
they extend the analysis to consider the separate effect of the NMW on job entry and job exit 
decisions. Both study the impact of the NMW by applying the difference-in-difference technique 
to the UK Labor Force Survey data, and find that the NMW does not have a significant adverse 
effect on employment. Unlike these papers, we do not consider a specific year’s increase in the 
minimum wage but take into account all NMW changes since its introduction in 1999. Finally, 
our approach allows us to identify the interactions of the NMW effect with other relevant variables 
such as gender, age, qualifications and business cycle without the necessity of proposing a 
parametric specification. 
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we shed some new light on the relationship 
between the minimum wage and employment. In particular, we find that the NMW exerts a 
positive and significant impact on both the probability job entry and job exit. Although the 
magnitude of the effect on job entry is larger, the overall effect of NMW is ambiguous as there 
are many more employed than unemployed workers. This could explain the insignificant effect 
found in the previous work based on aggregate macroeconomic estimations. We find also that the 
effect is stronger for younger workers and in high unemployment periods. On the other hand, 
gender and qualifications play little role in shaping the minimum wage effect. 
Second, we demonstrate the applicability of the BART approach to analyses of economic 
outcomes without imposing a specific parametric form a priori. While we chose the minimum 
wage effect on employment, this method could be applied to a broad range of other contexts 
equally well.  
In the next section, we present the data used. Sections 3 and 4 discuss methodological 
approaches used for analyzing the labor-market impact of the minimum wage and explain the 
main features of the BART model, respectively. Empirical results are shown and discussed in 
Section 5. The final section summarizes our findings and offers some conclusions.  
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2 Data 
Our analysis is based on the UK Labor Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a quarterly nationally-
representative survey of households across the UK. Each quarter, approximately 60 thousand 
households and over 100 thousand individuals aged 16 and above are surveyed. Each household 
is retained in the survey for five consecutive quarters, with one-fifth of households replaced in 
each wave. The survey contains detailed demographic and socio-economic information on the 
respondents, including, importantly, their labor-market outcomes. Since the NMW was 
introduced in April 1999, we use all quarterly datasets available from April–June 1999 to 
October–December 2011, pooling all available LFS waves during this period. In order to have a 
sufficient number of observations, we include all individuals aged between 16 and 40.  
The UK NMW features three different age-dependent rates: the 16–17 years old rate, the 
youth rate (applying to those aged 18–21)2, and the adult rate.3 Historically, the youth rate has 
remained some 35% higher than the 16–17 rate while the adult rate has exceeded the youth rate 
by around 20%. The LFS reports the date of birth of every respondent and also the date the survey 
was carried out. By comparing these two dates, we can determine the precise age of each 
respondent on the day of the survey.4 We therefore know whether a particular individual is below 
or above the age threshold at which they become eligible for a different (higher) NMW rate.  
3 Methodological considerations 
We analyze the effect of the NMW increases on employment by going beyond standard regression 
and matching estimation methodologies traditionally used for this purpose. Regardless of the 
methodology, the analysis involves comparing the changes in labor-market outcomes (such as 
employment) after a NMW change for the treatment and control groups.5 Consider the impact of 
NMW on the probability of job loss. The treatment group comprises workers whose wages have 
to go up in the wake of an annual NMW increase because the new NMW rate is higher than their 
current wage. The wages of those in the control group should be close to but just above the new 
rate so as not to have to change.  
_________________________ 
2 The upper limit for the youth rate has been lowered to 20 from October 2010. Where relevant, our analysis takes this 
change into account.  
3 A fourth rate, for apprentice workers, was introduced in October 2010 (we do not consider those subject to this rate 
in our analysis). No minimum wage applies to those who belong to one of the few exemptions such as members of the 
armed forces, volunteers, students on work placements, workers living in the employers’ households, and (until 2010) 
apprentices. 
4 The precise date of birth is not available in the publicly released LFS datasets. We are grateful to the Office for 
National Statistics for making the restricted release of the LFS available to us.  
5 Note that our approach is similar in spirit to the difference-in-difference approach in Stewart (2004) and Dickens and 
Draca (2005) who compare the average change in the employment status before and after the introduction of a very 
specific minimum wage policy. Of course, as we show in Table 1, the vector Xit incorporates time-invariant 
characteristics. Given that we consider a whole sample of minimum wage changes through thirteen years, our analysis 
is based on the estimation of the effect on the change in employment status, before and after the policy application, for 
the treatment and control groups.   
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More specifically, the treatment group can be defined as the individuals whose wages meet the 
following condition:  
nmwt < wit < nmwt+1 (1) 
Where nmwt is the (age-dependent) NMW rate in effect at time t while wit is the worker i’s wage. 
The control group is defined as the workers whose wage before the increase is greater than the 
new NMW rate but lower than some upper bound to ensure that we only consider workers earning 
just above the minimum wage (who, therefore, are likely to display similar characteristics as those 
earning the minimum wage). If we set the upper bound as a fraction c above the new rate. The 
control group thus comprises workers meeting the following condition: 
nmwt+1 ≤ wit < nmwt+1 ∗ (1 + c)  (2) 
We can then estimate the following equation  
𝑃(𝑒𝑡+1 = 0|𝑒𝑡 = 1) = Φ(𝛼 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑖𝑡)      (3) 
where the dependent variable is the probability that individual i is unemployed conditional on 
being employed in the preceding quarter, Φ(. )  is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, Di is a dummy variable denoting individuals belonging to the treatment group, included 
on its own and in interaction with the gap between individual i’s wage and the new NMW rate, 
and Xit collects all remaining covariates (individual socio-economic characteristics and time 
effects). An analogous equation can be estimated for the probability of remaining employed 
conditional on employment in the previous quarter. In line with the standard practice, equation 
(3), and in particular the coefficient estimate of the first term, is interpreted as capturing the 
differentiated effect of the minimum-wage increase on the probability of becoming unemployed 
for the treated individuals relative to those in the control group.  
A similar approach can be used to estimate the impact of NMW on the probability of job 
entry. In this case the equation to estimate is 
𝑃(𝑒𝑡+1 = 1|𝑒𝑡 = 0) = Φ(𝛼 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋)   (4) 
A particular problem presents itself here in the fact that we do not have any previous wage 
information for those who enter employment only after the NMW increase. In other words, we 
do not know whether those entering into employment after the increase would have earned more 
or less than the minimum wage before the increase. Dickens and Draca (2005) resolve this by 
defining the treatment group as those whose earnings are less than or equal to the (age-relevant) 
new NMW rate and the control group as those who earn up to c percent above the NMW:  
Treatment group: 𝑤𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑛𝑚𝑤𝑡+1  (5) 
Control group: 𝑛𝑚𝑤𝑡+1 < 𝑤𝑡+1 < 𝑛𝑚𝑤𝑡+1 ∗ (1 + 𝑐)  (6) 
A somewhat uncomfortable implication of this specification is that the treatment group now 
includes also those who earn less than the NMW (there are specific cases when this is allowed, 
for example for apprentices or for those who receive employer-provided accommodation or other 
in-kind payments). An alternative specification would entail constructing the treatment group as 
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including only those who earn the minimum wage after the NMW increase. Using that 
specification yields very similar results.  
Note that our analysis could suffer from a potential endogeneity problem as in a non-
experimental sample, such as the Labor Force Survey, workers earning less than the new NMW 
rate are more likely to lose their jobs even if NMW does not change because they are likely to be 
less productive than workers earning higher wages.6 If so, it is the characteristics associated with 
their lower wages (and not the minimum wage itself) that determine their higher probability of 
job loss compared to other individuals with above-NMW wages. In other words, if wages are not 
allocated randomly, the allocation of individuals into treatment and control groups is not random 
either but depends on their characteristics.  
In order to assess to what extent the two groups of individuals are similar, Table 1 presents 
some basic descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups, for the analyses of job exit 
and job entry alike. There are some differences: the individuals in the control groups are slightly 
more likely to have a university degree or higher education, less likely to have lower 
qualifications, they are more likely to be white rather than black or Asian, less likely to be a full 
time student, and they are more likely to live in the rest of South East and South West. However, 
these differences are generally small and the two groups appear rather similar.  
There are two standard approaches to estimate this causal impact. One is to compare the 
outcome variable of a treated individual with that of one or several other individuals who are as 
similar as possible to the treated individuals with respect to the values of covariates 𝑋𝑖𝑡. A second 
approach matches participants and nonparticipants based on their estimated propensity scores. 
However, the application of these methodologies is only possible if there is a region of common 
support between the treatment and control groups.  
Regardless of the approach used, the average treatment effect is defined as  
ATE = E[Y(1) − Y(0)], where the expected value is computed with respect to the probability 
distribution of Y for all individuals. We focus on the causal effect for a given set of individuals, 
for example those who have received the treatment, E[Y(1) − Y(0)|D = 1], that is, individuals 
affected by NMW increases. In this case, the expected value is estimated with respect to the 
conditional distribution of (Y|D = 1). Even more generally, if we have a set of covariates X we 
can estimate the causal effect conditional on them, that is, conditional on  X = x 
However, this is not always possible because matrix 𝑋 typically has a very high 
dimensionality and comprises a wide range of covariates, including qualitative and quantitative 
variables, and some standard approaches such as, for example, the propensity score, cannot be 
applied if the number of covariates is too high. This forces the analyst to consider a set of variables 
of lower dimension, putting the strong ignorability assumption in doubt.7 Besides, the  
 
_________________________ 
6 Note however that in expressions (2) and (6), small values of c would imply that the salary of the treated and control 
groups could be deemed to be very similar. 
7 See Caliendo and Kopeining (2008) and references therein for a discussion on this issue. 
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 11 (2017–15) 
www.economics-ejournal.org 7 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.  
 Job entry  Job exit  
 Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Highest qualification     
Degree or equivalent 3.29 4.31 5.04 6.02 
Higher education 3.99 4.29 4.7 5.25 
GCE A level or equivalent 25.92 25.59 22.58 22.92 
GCSE grade A-C or equivalent 33.38 35.35 33.88 35.72 
Other qualification 16.24 15.43 18.82 15.81 
No qualification 14.55 12.29 12.67 12 
Ethnic origin     
White 90.17 91.09 91.91 93.07 
Black 6.47 6.23 6.02 5.6 
Asian 1.78 1.57 1.98 1.17 
Region of usual residence     
Tyne & Wear 3.7 2.36 3.18 2.46 
Rest of Northern region 6.47 4.83 5.49 5.2 
South Yorkshire 3.62 3.49 3.96 3.43 
West Yorkshire 4.11 5.14 5.7 4.76 
Rest of Yorks & Humberside 4.11 3.55 4.21 3.99 
East Midlands 9.36 10.27 11.06 9.63 
East Anglia 3.18 4.2 2.89 2.99 
Inner London 1.34 0.92 0.87 1.11 
Outer London 2.68 2.78 2.19 2.17 
Rest of South East 11.69 14.05 10.44 13.84 
South West 7.41 9.35 9 9.7 
West Midlands (met county) 5.19 4.06 3.84 4.19 
Rest of West Midlands 5.19 5.56 5.16 5.67 
Greater Manchester 5.16 4.79 4.21 4.45 
Merseyside 3.06 2.2 2.19 2.44 
Rest of North West 4.29 4.43 4.46 3.92 
Wales 6.82 6.02 6.03 5.67 
Strathclyde 4.93 4.56 4.75 3.81 
Rest of Scotland 5.45 5.71 5.57 6.69 
Northern Ireland 2.24 1.74 4.8 3.9 
Whether full time student     
Full time student  19.27 15.03 10.03 8.88 
Not full time student  80.35 84.76 89.97 91.12 
Sex     
Male  32.48 28.98 27.12 30.14 
Female  67.52 71.02 72.88 69.86 
Notes: Missing, ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’ responses are not reported.  
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specification of regression models with many variables makes it not practical to consider all 
possible interactions among the variables. Again, this forces the analyst to consider only 
interactive effects among first or second order covariates or to use algorithms such as the forward 
or backward variable selection that may provide locally optimal models. Unfortunately, there is 
no theoretical justification, only empirical results, to guide us in assessing the scope of a local 
instead of a global optimum.    
Due to these drawbacks, we make use of a particular type of matching estimation based on 
the BART model for the estimation of causal impact of NMW increases. Being a non-parametric 
model, this frees us from being restricted by a given model specification. Furthermore, it allows 
us to estimate with a satisfactory precision the response of the variable of interest to NMW 
increases, and with that, the counterfactual result even for a high dimensional 𝑋. An additional 
important advantage of this approach is that it allows for identification of the most significant 
interactive effects between the treatment variable and any of the covariates without being 
constrained to include these interactions in any parametric form. 
In order to assume that the outcome is independent of the treatment, it is necessary to account 
for all possible conditioning factors by including a broad range of covariates, 𝑋. More specifically, 
the strong ignorability hypothesis with respect to the allocation of treatment states that 𝑌 is 
conditionally independent of D given 𝑋 and that the probability of treatment allocation is always 
positive regardless of the specific value of 𝑋. However, like in other matching methods, this does 
not preclude the possibility of selection on unobservables. Under this hypothesis, the estimation 
of the marginal effects associated to the treatment variable can be considered in general as a 
consistent and unbiased estimation of the causal effect of NMW on the probability of job exit and 
job entry: including a relevant set of covariates in equations (3) and (4) is a sufficient condition 
to ensure an unbiased estimation. However, as argued by Morgan and Winship (2007), the 
regression approach can be subject to two important drawbacks. The first relates to the fact that 
the causal effect of NMW is not constant across individuals. In this case, the estimated causal 
effect represent a conditional variance weighted estimate of causal effects of individuals and the 
causal estimation is only unbiased and consistent for this particularly weighted average that is not 
usually the parameter of interest. The second problem relates to the fact that the strong ignorability 
condition does not necessarily imply that treatment is uncorrelated with the error term net of 
adjustment for 𝑋 as this error term depends on the specification of covariates, 𝑋. Therefore, in 
order to interpret the estimation of a regression strategy as a reliable causal effect, we require a 
fully flexible parameterization of 𝑋. 
4 BART model  
In the following explanation of the model, we mainly follow the notation of Hill (2011) and 
references therein (see Chipman et al., 2010, for details of the statistical model, and Leonti et al., 
2010, for an application of this model to the estimation of a causal effect of the use of medical 
plants). Let Ɗ𝑎𝑡𝑎 be the available data, that is the set 𝑌, 𝑋, 𝐷 observed for 𝑁 individuals and  
𝜋(∙ | ∙) the probability distribution of the left argument conditional to the right argument. The aim 
of the analysis is to estimate the posterior probability distribution of the causal effect, that is 
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𝜋(𝐴𝑇𝐸|Ɗ𝑎𝑡𝑎), or the same posterior distribution but conditionally on some covariates, 
𝜋(𝐴𝑇𝐸|Ɗ𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑋 = 𝑥). In order to do this we use a non-parametric regression model. The novelty 
in these types of causal inference analyses is the use of a Bayesian regression model known as 
BART. As in all Bayesian models, we need a likelihood function defined for a set of parameters, 
θ ∈ Θ ∉ ℝ, and a prior distribution π(θ), θ ∈ Θ. The likelihood function, L(Y|X, D, θ) , is obtained 
from the following additive regression model, where the mean of 𝑌, 𝐸(𝑌) = 𝑃𝑖(𝑌 = 1) = 𝑃, is 
determined from the sum of estimated models for the response variable: 
𝑃 = Φ[∑ 𝑔(𝑋, 𝐷; 𝑇𝑗, 𝑀𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1 ]  (7) 
where  𝑔(𝑋, 𝐷; 𝑇𝑗, 𝑀𝑗) is a classification tree with the variables and split points represented by 𝑇𝑗 
and the terminal nodes denoted by 𝑀𝑗 and computed with respect to the values 𝑥, 𝐷 that belong 
to the individual whose response is 𝑌. Essentially, 𝑔 is a function that gives to each individual 𝑖 
their expected value in the jth tree, 𝜇𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑗. This part of the model, ∑ 𝑔(𝑋, 𝐷; 𝑇𝑗, 𝑀𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1 , operates 
in the same way as the usual linear predictor in an ordinary regression model, in fact if we 
substitute the sum of trees with the usual linear predictor, we were dealing with the ordinary linear 
regression model with the least square estimator. Of course the problem at hand needs a very 
flexible model, which would be very difficult to be obtained with a linear predictor. Essentially, 
viewing by 𝑇𝑗 and the terminal nodes denoted by 𝑀𝑗 as model parameters, we allow the data to 
define the terms that enter into this kind of linear predictor instead being fixed beforehand by the 
analyst. The final score estimated for the ith individual would correspond to the average of the m 
scores over all trees in which each tree has been grown in order to capture a specific aspect of the 
relation between the response is 𝑌 and the rest of predictors. It is well known that, in order to 
minimize the forecast error, classification trees tend to grow disproportionally until generating 
overfitting in the response and that in general an estimator obtained from many simple trees is 
more efficient than another one obtained from a single complex tree. Examples of these types of 
models are Boosting (Schapire and Singer, 1999) and Random Forest (Breiman, 2001). 
In order to achieve this necessary tree simplification, we use a regularization prior on the size 
of the tree 𝜋(𝑇, 𝑀) as specified in Chipman et al (2010). This regularization prior precludes the 
tree from growing too much and makes sure that each of the 𝜇𝑖𝑗 contributes in a marginal way to 
the estimation of the response function. As Chipman et al (2010) show, the hyper parameters of 
all prior distributions are specified in relation to the observed sample. It produces priors that are 
dependent on the sample. This procedure, which is not very orthodox from a Bayesian point of 
view, is part of the approaches known as empirical Bayes that are very popular and have been 
enhanced from a theoretical point of view by Petrone et al. (2013). As explained by Hill (2011), 
the results of this type of analysis are robust with respect to prior modifications. 
Using the priors specified above it is possible to simulate samples of the posterior distribution 
with a non-excessive computational effort using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), more 
specifically using Metropolis Hastings. In particular, the proposal distribution used in the MCMC 
to update the values of 𝑇𝑗 and 𝑀𝑗 consists of adding/dropping a terminal node and changing a split 
variable or a split point with the probabilities specified in Chipman et al. (2010). Such 
probabilities, which finally define the proposal in the MCMC scheme, are set according to the 
observations in order to guarantee an optimal mixing of the chain and so increase the precision in 
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the posterior estimation. Once the posterior distribution of  𝜃 = (𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚, 𝑀1, … , 𝑀𝑚) has been 
obtained, the predictive distribution for the probability of job exit is: 
𝑚(𝑌𝑖|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) = ∫ 𝐿(𝑌𝑖; 𝜃)𝑑𝜋(𝜃|𝜋(𝜃))𝜃∈Θ  (8) 
where 𝐿 is the likelihood function for 𝜃 ∈ Θ and 𝜋(𝜃) is the posterior. Integral (8) is practically 
estimated by generating values of 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖(𝑌𝑖 = 1), using the normal distribution with the mean 
and variance for each value 𝜃 in the chain MCMC and the regression tress computed using the 
values of regressors for individual 𝑖 , that is 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖. In particular we use 𝑚=500 trees and 5000 
MCMC steps after an initial burn-in of 1000 steps.  
In this way, the distribution for each individual and the corresponding counterfactual response 
can be estimated simply by estimating the response in Di = 1 if the worker is affected by NMW 
and in Di = 0 otherwise. Once these predictive posterior distributions have been obtained, the 
difference between the factual and counterfactual responses are considered to obtain the 
distribution of the individual causal effect. Finally, π(ATE\) is estimated from the set of the 
differences for all the individuals. Finally, the estimation of the conditional causal effect is 
obtained simply by considering the difference for the individuals that fulfill the condition X = x. 
5 Results 
As a first step, and to establish a benchmark to compare our results against, we report the results 
of a probit model as specified in Equations (3) and (4), where job entry and job exit are functions 
of the dummy variable for the treatment along with a set of covariates (Table 2).8 In this 
regression, the parameter 𝑐 defined in the previous section is set to be 0.1 to ensure that treatment 
and control individuals are comparable in terms of wages but the results are qualitatively similar 
when we consider 𝑐 = 0.3, 𝑐 = 0.5 and 𝑐 = 1. The last row of Table 2 indicates that the 
probabilities of job entry and job exit are both positively correlated with being in the treatment 
group.  
It is interesting to compare these results with those obtained with a standard matching 
procedure such as the propensity score. The estimation results are qualitatively, and even 
quantitatively, similar to those obtained from a regression probit model. More specifically, the 
estimated causal impact for job entry is 0.051 with standard deviation 0.013 while that for job 
exit is 0.03 with standard deviation 0.011.9 The fact that the two sets of results are very similar is 
not surprising as the matching estimation can be interpreted as being similar to a regression 
 
_________________________ 
8 Besides standard socio-economic characteristics, we also include an indicator to account for the fact that the age limit 
for the adult rate was lowered from 22 to 21 from October 2010. 
9 These results are available upon request.  
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Table 2. Probability of job entry and job exit as a function of treatment and change.  
                 Probit regression 
 Job entry Job exit 
LR Chi2   445.13 400.17 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 0.0000 
Number of obs  7792 6746 
Treatment  .0517764** 
(.00961) 
.024584** 
(.0086) 
Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at mean values. Significance: ** 1%, * 5%.  
 
that puts more weight on the observations in the treatment and control groups that are very similar 
to each other.   
The Bayesian approach considered here is instead based on the estimation of the expected 
value of the treatment and control groups using the same explanatory variables in both cases. 
Figure 1 reports the estimated distributions of the total causal impact of increases in the minimum 
wage rate on job exit and job entry using the BART model with all workers aged 18–40. The 
results indicate that the treatment has positive effects on both job entry and job exit, in a manner 
similar to the probit results reported above. More specifically, the NMW exerts a positive impact 
on job entry, and the mean value of this causal impact is 5% with a 95% confidence interval of 
[3.2%, 6.9%]. For job exit, the effect is positive with the mean value equal to 2% and with a 95% 
confidence interval of [1%, 4%]. Three cautionary notes are required here. First, the 
aforementioned effects are only measured for those workers actually affected by the NMW 
increase. The minimum-wage increases only affect low-paid workers and  
 
Figure 1. Posterior distribution of the causal effect of job entry and job exit 
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need not apply throughout the distribution of wages. Second, although the estimated effect on job 
entry is larger than that for job exit, the overall effect of NMW is ambiguous as there are many 
more employed workers (who are candidates for job exit) than unemployed individuals 
(candidates for job entry). Third, it is possible that NMW increases have spillover effects whereby 
wages just above the new minimum wage also increase. The available literature suggests that such 
spillovers are small or none in the UK (Dickens and Manning, 2004; Stewart, 2011). If present, 
such spillovers would bias the estimated effects downwards.  
As discussed above, one of the most important advantages of the BART approach is that it 
allows for the simultaneous estimation of any kind of interaction between the treatment variable 
and any of the covariates. This is possible either at model estimation or at description level of the 
obtained results. Here we consider the result at the description level by inspecting the interaction 
between covariates and the estimated causal effect. In particular, the interaction with categorical 
variables is evaluated trough boxplots, which include 95% percentile bootstrap confidence 
intervals for the median, while the interactions with continuous covariates by local polynomial 
regression smoother (loess) along with their 95% confidence intervals (Cleveland et al., 1992, 
Chp. 8) . 
In Figure 2, we present the interaction between the NMW increase and the size of the increase. 
While the effect of size is significant, no systematic pattern can be discerned: the estimated effects 
oscillate around the mean values reported in Figure 1, neither increasing nor decreasing as the 
size of the NMW change goes up. Next, we interact gender with the effect of NMW increases 
(Figure 3). Again, the previous finding of a greater effect of NMW increases on job exit than on 
job entry is reproduced. Although for job entry it is clear that the median values are significantly 
different, the distributions of the two effects are very similar which suggests that gender plays 
little role. In Figure 4, in turn, we consider the interaction with age (expressed in months rather 
than years). Here, the pattern is different for job exit and entry. While the causal impact of NMW 
is decreasing with age in both cases, that decline is much steeper for job entry. This is not 
surprising, given that young workers are more vulnerable to NMW increases. Besides, the 
interactive effect is clearly stronger for job entry. In Figure 5, we consider the interaction with the 
highest attained qualification. Again, although it is possible to observe significantly different 
mean values associated to the different qualifications, the whole distribution of the estimated 
causal effect indicates that this variable is not a relevant factor to explain differences in the causal 
impact of NMW either for job entry or job exit. Finally, Figure 6 presents the interaction with the 
regional business cycle – measured using the unemployment rate. Interestingly, this interaction 
effect is very different for the two labor-market flows: the minimum-wage effect on job exit is 
relatively low and depends little on the regional unemployment rate, whereas that for job entry is 
higher and positively related to regional unemployment. This implies that the effect of the 
minimum wage on job entry differs considerably between recessions and booms, whereas the 
business cycle has little bearing on how the minimum wage shapes job exits.  
So far we have been considering the effects of NMW changes for two similar groups, those 
affected by the change and those who are unaffected but are otherwise similar to the affected 
individuals both in terms of their wage and in terms of the other covariates used in the analysis. 
However, to test for the robustness of our results even further, we carry out a falsification  
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Figure 2. NMW Increases, Job Exit/Entry and Size of the Increase 
 
 
Figure 3. NMW Increases, Job Exit/Entry and Gender 
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Figure 4. NMW Increases, Job Exit/Entry and Age 
 
Note: Shadow area indicates the 95% confidence interval of the local polynomial regression estimator (loess). 
Figure 5. NMW Increases, Job Exit/Entry and Qualifications 
 
Notes: 1 Degree or equivalent, 2 Higher education, 3 GCE A Level or equivalent, 4 GCSE grades A-C or equivalent, 
5 Other qualifications, 6 No qualification, 7 Don’t know 
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Figure 6. NMW Increases, Job Exit/Entry and Business Cycle 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the regional unemployment rate. Shadow area indicates the 95% confidence 
interval of the local polynomial regression estimator (loess). 
 
experiment whereby we define the treatment and control groups as if the NMW were equal to the 
actual NMW plus 2£. Our hypothesis is that neither job entry nor job exit should be affected by a 
wrongly-defined increase in the NMW. The results of this experiment, shown in Figure 7, indicate 
that the causal impact of the (false) NMW increase is significant at the 5% level for job entry but 
not for job exit. We find similar conclusions for other artificial NMW rates (results are available 
from the authors upon request). Importantly, the insignificant falsification test results for job exit 
give strong support to the finding that the employment of workers earning the minimum wage is 
adversely affected by NMW increases. 
The fact that the falsification test is significant for job entry decisions could be due to potential 
unobservable variables not included in the model. Another possibility is that it is driven by 
spillover effects of the actual NMW increase: the NMW change can lead to ripple effects for wage 
rates above the minimum wage.10  To account for this possibility, we consider an alternative 
definition of the control group:  
_________________________ 
10 As long as the direct effect of the NMW increase is larger than the indirect (spill-over) effect, we can obtain a 
significant result. Otherwise, it would be impossible to define control and treatment groups. As discussed above, the 
available evidence so far suggests that such spillovers are limited or zero (Dickens and Manning, 2004; Stewart, 2011).  
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nmwt+1 ∗ (1 + a) ≤ wit < nmwt+1 ∗ (1 + c) ∗ (1 + a + 𝑐)  (9) 
where a = 0.1. The treatment group is defined as before (see equation 2). The new definition 
ensures that the control and treatment groups are close enough but are not immediately adjacent 
to each other in the distribution of wages. The results with the alternatively defined control group, 
presented in Figure 8, confirm the previous results: the mean effect is the same for job exit and is 
only slightly higher for job entry with the new control group. This suggests that the spillovers are 
very limited, if any.  
Figure 7. Falsification Test: NMW + £2 
 
Notes: The falsification test simulates the NMW being £2 higher than the actual value. 
Figure 8. Alternative Control Group  
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6 Concluding remarks 
We estimate the causal impact of the NMW on the probability of job entry and job exit in the UK, 
applying a novel methodology to this context, the Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART). 
An important advantage of this procedure is that it allows the identification of the most important 
interactions between the treatment variable and other covariates in the model. We find that the 
NMW exerts a significantly positive effect both on job entry and job exit, with the impact on job 
entry being relatively stronger (given that there are fewer unemployed than employed workers, 
the absolute size of the flows cannot be readily compared). The causal effect of NMW is found 
to be higher for young workers and in periods of high unemployment; both of these interactions 
are more prominent for job entry than for job exit. However, no significant interactions were 
found with gender and worker qualification. Overall, the effect of the NMW on low-paid workers 
is stronger for job entry than for job exit.  
Most importantly, our paper opens new lines of research that can be explored in subsequent 
work. For example, this fully flexible approach could be adapted to deal with some recent issues 
in the literature about the importance of the econometric specification on estimating the effect of 
minimum wage using panel data models in US states. Also, it could be used to estimate the 
possible interactions between the federal minimum wage and the state minimum wages, as done 
by Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012), without the necessity of estimating two different models.  
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